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Introduction
The present study scrutinizes the prerequisites of "structural stability"-understood as the ability of societies to deal with their conflicts nonviolently. Structural stability has political, economic, ecological, and social components. From the official definitions of the EU (1996) The context of the EU's and the OECD's preoccupation with the topic in the 1990s was the completely new manifestation of political competition (or a changed perception of it) after the end of the Cold War: the "third wave" of democratization on the one hand and the increase of violent conflicts related to the deterioration of states-"failing states"-or similarly labeled phenomena on the other. Both organizations have therefore limited their designations-based on practical imperatives and a minimal consensus of normative orientation-solely to states going through fundamental change. The Portuguese presidency of the EU (2007) prepared a study with "structural stability" in its title. 1 However, such an action is taking the second step before the first by solidifying arguments and conflating political elements instead of verifying scientifically postulated correlations. The present study is set to initiate the latter step.
The premise (in the EU definition) that the identified dimensions of structural stability are closely related and enhance each other is significant for development cooperation. It follows that the promotion of one pillar can have positive effects on another. However, the reverse correlation could hold as well: the status of one dimension could decline due to the strengthening of another (especially if unintended effects occur). Herein lies the scientific interest: It seems possible that a short-term objective in one dimension of structural stability could interfere with a goal within another dimension. Linear correlations are therefore not necessarily to be expected. In order to test the assumed correlations, the creation of adequate hypotheses and their operationalization and verification/falsification is required.
This study has four objectives: (1) The creation of a complete set of indicators to assess the seven dimensions of structural stability, (2) the development of profiles of structural stability/instability, (3) the formation of clusters of countries which have certain characteristics in common and the depiction of types of structural instability (or of deficits in structural stability, respectively), and (4) the presentation of initial deliberations on the verification/conception of the assumed reciprocal enhancement and interconnection of the seven dimensions of structural stability. For this purpose, correlations of the relations of the seven dimensions to one another are tested statistically.
The structure of the paper will be as follows. In the second section we present the indicators used for the seven dimensions, which are defined as independent variables. Violence/human security is the dependent variable. A calculation of partial correlations follows. The partly inadequate quality of data allows only for cautious conclusions. Section 4 presents the structural stability "profiles" of the 58 countries selected 2 and discusses the clustering of cases.
Section 5 summarizes the main findings and presents issues for further research.
Indicators and Data Sources
The selection of indicators used is outlined below and the data sources are specified. The selection criterion was the status as "partner country" of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) which funded the original study this Working Paper is based on. 3 For a more extensive discussion of the literature and indicators used please contact the authors of this study in order to access the original study document. 7
Long-term Economic Growth
Economic growth refers to a state in which macroeconomic assets (including natural resources) increase, or at least do not decrease, and which is manifested by a growing per capita income over the course of time. Long-term economic growth depends on the capability of increasing the accumulation of physical and human capital and on increased productivity due to technological progress.
The recognized indicator for economic growth is the productivity with which states make use of their productive resources (physical, human, and natural capital). Because an accurate quantification of productivity proves to be difficult, economists usually apply the GDP or GNP instead. The advantages of this procedure are, firstly, that the GDP/GNP is easy to measure; secondly, that the GDP/GNP is a rough measure for the relative productivity of resource deployment; and thirdly, that it measures relative material welfare, irrespective of the sources of growth (for example, favorable natural resources as opposed to the effective productivity of their use). Thus, for the study of structural stability the following indicators were considered: 1) real GNP per capita, 2) real GDP per capita, and 3) real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP).
Although some criticisms regarding per capita income as an indicator of economic growth can be found in the literature (for example, it does not express income disparity; it does not measure social progress and "quality of life," or the informal or black economy), this measure was selected. The reason for its selection is the relatively good comparability between countries, its broad acceptance in scientific research, and the discriminatory power in regard to other dimensions of structural stability. An indicator equally powerful and capable of resolving the criticism is unknown so far.
As, since the early 1990s, the real GDP 4 per capita has replaced the GNP 5 worldwide as the dominant indicator of economic growth, it was selected for this study. Unfortunately, it was not possible to use GDP per capita in purchasing power parity due to a lack of adequate data for all countries investigated. The annual growth in GDP per capita indicator is a widely recognized measure for almost all economic studies on growth with regard to sustainability, speed, determinants, and effects of allocation, among others. For example, annual data for this indicator can be found in the Penn World GDP measures the sum of the value added by the labor and capital of all citizens (resident units), plus the taxes on production and import, minus the subsidies (= net national income), plus write-offs (= gross national income).
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Real GNP per capita (at constant prices) measures the aggregate output of a given economy. In the output compilation it is based on the sum of all production values (domestic concept); all goods and services produced in a country, valued at market prices of a reference year; plus product taxes and minus advance payments and subsidies.
Environmental Security
Environmental security describes the lowest possible amount of environmental stress a state or society, respectively, is exposed to. Environmental stress is defined as the lasting and/or sudden negative change of an ecosystem.
In the search for applicable indicators, sudden sporadic shocks (such as tsunamis, for example) were disregarded as they can hardly be registered in time series. Also, human vulnerability was excluded as an important component for indicators, since a comprehensive understanding is difficult to achieve. Based on these considerations, the focus was placed on environmental stress with regard to water, population, and soil. The problem ensued that environmental issues and natural premises (forest stand, water supply, deserts) differ greatly between countries and are therefore difficult to compare globally. Therefore, an initial set of indicators of key factors of environmental stress had to be discarded due to problems of comparability: 1) population growth, 2) basic food insecurity, 3) soil, and 4) potable water.
For the same reason, two combined environmental indicators also had to be discarded: 1) in- The disadvantages of the indicators selected for the dimension of environmental stress are their possible partial overlaps with the dimension of "government effectiveness," and the fact that data is only available for 1990 for , or 1990 ter close examination, it was determined that these internationally recognized indicators did not correlate with indicators of "government effectiveness," at least not significantly. To ensure improved comparability between the states, these two indicators were aggregated. This helped-to some extent-to qualify the problem of the countries' different initial situations with regard to the different dimensions of environmental security. For example, an initial situation of a low reserve of potable water (resulting automatically in negative values) can be put in perspective by adding a value for slum population as an indicator of another dimension of environmental stress.
Social Equality
Social equality describes a status in which all individuals have equal chances and opportunities to live their chosen way of life without having to endure extreme deprivations. These opportunities have to encompass access to assets and resources (including public services and political power).
Social inequality within states is reflected in a disparate allocation of economic, political, and social resources based on group and individual differences such as group identity, gender, level of prosperity, or geographic position. Often promoted by the elites, these inequalities are internalized by the marginalized or dominated parts of the population. Social inequality tends to be reproduced over the course of time and over generations and thus often remains a lasting condition.
Indicators that measure mainly the distribution of results and only indirectly the distribution of opportunities seem favorable. The following indicators were considered: 1) the Human Development Index (HDI), 2) stunting rates, 3) the Gini Index, and 4) income percentile ratios (quintiles, deciles, percentiles).
The Gini Index 6 has few overlaps with indicators of other dimensions of structural stability.
Furthermore, from an economic point of view, it is assumed that the distribution of income/ consumption reflects both the access individuals have to goods and services and their personal welfare. In this sense a connection can be drawn to the level of education or health care.
Finally, if prosperity is connected to higher political influence, income-or consumption-based inequality can, conversely, also reflect low chances of exerting political influence (World Bank, 2005, pp. 36f.) .
The Gini Index is the most suitable for measuring dimensions of "social equality" with regard to structural stability. 7 Although the collection frequency and the quality of the data differ for the various states, the quality of the data for most of the 58 countries of our sample is relatively good (as opposed, for example, to the income percentile ratios). For most of the countries, data is available for various years over a period from 1990 until today. 6 The Gini Index measures the scale of variance in regard to a perfect allocation of income or consumption between the individuals/households of an economy. The Lorenz curve is used to show the cumulative percental distribution of different parts of the population to the national income (classified after consecutive income brackets, beginning with the lowest group). The Gini coefficient takes up values between 0 (= total equality) and 1 (= total inequality). The index is available for at least 152 states, for different points in time between 1950 and today (based on national household polls taken at varying intervals). 7 Nevertheless, in using the Gini Index one has to consider two aspects that are not optimal: on the one hand, comparability of the states (with regard to differing databases to measure indicators (income/consumption), differing itemization of consumer goods, differing income data based on household polls etc.) and, on the other hand, the capability of describing different configurations of income distributions (a strong equality in lower income with a strong disparity in higher income could generate the same coefficient as a strong disparity in lower groups with strong equality in higher groups).
Government Effectiveness
Government effectiveness is understood by Grindle (1996, p. 10) as the "ability of states to deliver goods and services […] and carry out the normal administrative functions of government, such as revenue collection, necessary economic regulation, and information management." Typically, a high level of government effectiveness would be denoted by the state's ability to implement policy and to prepare policies based on expertise.
In searching for data sources, the problem of how to depict the level of government effectiveness of a given state comprehensively and validly arose. This is why generally acknowledged perception indicators, which depict perceptions by experts, were short-listed above others: 1)
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)-category: steering capability; 2) Governance In- 
Democracy
Democracy is defined as the entire adult population being able to participate in political decision making by voting in regular, free, and fair elections, in which multiple interest groups or candidates, respectively, compete freely for votes to win the highest political positions (a seat in parliament or the presidency). This should ensure a peaceful transfer of political power. As long as elections are accepted by everybody involved as open, free, and fair, election results can be deemed democratic.
In searching for valid data sources, we encountered the problem that with regard to several aspects of constitutional practice or reality, aggregated data is scarce. Following the working definition, several internationally recognized indicators were scrutinized, of which the following had to be discarded because they were inconclusive: 8 Governance Matters V offers an aggregated indicator for 213 states and territories compiled from data from various institutions. The indicator "government effectiveness" is defined as "the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. indicator has a scale of values from one to seven, with seven being the lowest value and one being the highest. An operationalization of Freedom House means applying a perception indicator, which is not free of methodological doubt. After testing it in regard to the working definition, the extent of data for the countries concerned, and its temporal dimension, it proved to be an applicable indicator. Slight overlaps with the dimension "rule of law" had to be accepted due to the lack of more suitable indicators.
Rule of Law
Rule of law is given when freedom and legal certainty is secured for individuals. The authorities of the state do not act arbitrarily but rather within the civil rights (constitution) proclaimed by the people or their representatives; governmental actions serve law and justice while being under independent juridical control, and individuals are guaranteed steadfast civil rights.
In consequence of the definition and cornerstones mentioned above, the operationalization of the dimension has to emphasize not only individual civil rights, but also juridical control over executive actions. A variety of internationally recognized indicators were scrutinized, of which the following had to be discarded as inconclusive in terms of time covered and empiri- As data is available for 2006 only, we decided to use the category political rights, which is available for a longer period, as a replacement indicator for the more precise electoral process subcategory. The recorded data shows that only one indicator complied with the requirements in regard to quality and long-term time frame: Freedom House (FH)-category: civil liberty. 10 The FH civil liberty category offers an aggregated index of four elements (freedom of expression and belief, association and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights). The category refers above all to fundamental liberties to be guaranteed by the state under rule of law (principle of substantive law), but through the subcategory rule of law it refers also to further cornerstones of rule of law as defined above (separation of powers, legal certainty and protection, equality before the law). The FH indicator has data on 192 states for the period from 1973 to 2006. It has a scale of values from one to seven, with seven being the lowest value and one being the highest. An operationalization of the FH indicator means the application of a perception indicator, which is not free from methodological doubts. Yet, after scrutinizing the source in regard to our working definition, the extent of the available data, and the time frame, it proved to be valid.
Inclusion of Identity Groups
The inclusion of identity groups means the acknowledgement of specific social groups as well as their integration into political decision-making processes. This refers to social groups which differ from other groups through identity-forming characteristics and which are systematically discriminated against. The definition restricts itself to conflict-relevant reference areas such as ethnicity and religion.
The database for a worldwide comparison of this dimension proved to be very poor. Interesting current databases such as Minority at Risk turned out to be fragmentary in regard to the states considered. Part of the information is only available for the years up to 2000. A second indicator taken into account for religion had to be discarded: the Cingranelli (CIRI) Human
Rights Dataset-indicator: Freedom of Religion. 11 It was not suitable for the correlation calculation. Besides, only religious identities could be depicted.
Due to the problem of having only insufficient indicators at hand, we had to construct an indicator of our own. The Crises Indicators Catalogue (Krisenindikatorenkatalog, KIK) compiled annually by the GIGA for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) was used. Suitable indicators for both reference areas (religion and ethnicity) could not be determined, although the term "cultural identity" would suggest the inclusion of religious groups as well. Due to the unfavorable data situation, a restriction to only one indicator (focusing on ethnicity) had to be carried out; from analysis sector 1 (structural disparities) and analysis sector 4 (transformation and modernization processes), the following questions were combined into an indicator: 10 The FH rule of law subcategory evaluates separation of powers, legal certainty, legal protection, and equality before the law. As a single category it is available for 2006 only and therefore does not allow for temporal comparisons.
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Cf. CIRI Human Rights Data project: <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_variables_short_descrip tions.pdf> (last accessed Feb. 27, 2007). 13 1.1 Is there any significant correlation between the distribution of wealth and group identities based on having a common cultural, regional, social or political identity? (Answers: no, yes) diminished; yes, with a) it will be intensified, b) one or more groups perceive these changes as a threat to their existence-multiple answers in the "yes" category possible)
Questions 1.1-1.4 and 4.2 were used as follows:
• No question answered with "yes" = 5
• One question answered with "yes" = 4
• Two questions answered with "yes" = 3
• Three questions answered with "yes" = 2
• Four questions answered with "yes" = 1
• All four questions answered with "yes" and question 4.2 additionally answered with "yes"
plus "in the perception of one or more groups these changes pose an existential threat" = 0.
This results in the following categories: 0 = significant group disparities and strong states of competition and existential threat through change data sources, is problematic in several respects. The following data sources had to be discarded: Database-Online (1989 -2005 .
The following three individual data sets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
were combined to form an indicator that could reach beyond battle deaths with regard to conflict-related victims:
• Nevertheless, the resulting indicator also proved to be fragmentary and questionable with regard to the data situation and also had to be discarded.
After scrutinizing several examples of states with regard to the classification of the intensity of conflicts, the data source outlined in the following section qualified as a conclusive indicator for the dependent variable "violence"/"human security."
2.9
Peace and Conflict-Human Security Subindex • armed conflicts and rebellions,
• intercommunal fighting,
• refugee and internally displaced populations,
• state repression,
• terrorism, and, in a few cases,
• genocide.
The subindex arranges human security into four levels: (1) countries that have performed well and have experienced little or no human security problems during the previous ten-year period, (2) countries that have had some human security problems but not at higher levels as noted below, (3) countries that have had problems of a somewhat lower magnitude over a more limited span of time, (4) countries that have had a generally high level of human security problems in several of the categories over a substantial period of time. The disadvantage of the comparatively short time frame (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) had to be accepted for want of a better indicator.
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Cross-sectional Analysis: Human Security and the Dimensions of Structural Stability
The following analysis serves to verify the relationship between the dependent variable, violence/human security, chosen in the project (data source: human security subindex of the Peace and Conflict Index, CIDCM) and the independent variables that were selected as indicators for the previously presented seven dimensions of structural stability. The starting point is the assumption that the structural stability of the studied countries-understood as their ability to deal with conflicts nonviolently-is strongly related, as previously mentioned, to longterm economic growth, environmental security, social equality, government effectiveness, democracy, rule of law, and the inclusion of identity groups. The sample is based on the list of BMZ partner countries. Therefore, the range of countries available for analysis has been lim- In contrast, with a high level of inclusion of identity groups, human security is higher; thus, by implication, human security is lower in cases of a high level of exclusion (see Table 1 ).
This means that, at least for this study and for the entire 58 cases, long-term economic growth, environmental security, social equality, and government effectiveness have little significance for structural stability. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that a) indicators other than the ones carefully chosen offer a better approximation and that b) in certain historical constellations these variables (depicted by the chosen indicators) do hold explanatory power.
It is also possible that the concept (developed from a political perspective) has limitations in terms of validity. This delineates other tasks that cannot be covered by this study.
More interesting are the remaining independent variables characterized by a positive correlation with the dependent variable: democracy, rule of law, and inclusion of identity groups apparently hold more explanatory power, as shown in the following steps of the analysis (see Section 4 below). 15 The level of significance shows that the respective variables are indeed relevant in their relation with the dependent variable, but not how strong this relation is. It should by no means be concluded that the respective variable plays a special role in the tested context based solely on the level of significance. 
Types of Structural Stability

Graphical Presentation of Structural Stability
The analysis of the seven dimensions of structural stability shows that each country exhibits a specific profile. The aim of this section is the graphical presentation of these profiles. In a second step, this leads to the formation of different types according to the countries' respective expression of dimensions of structural stability. It has to be stated that this endeavor does not amount to a validation of the concept of structural stability; it merely aims to provide a graphical presentation and a categorization of different types of structural stability. For example, an array of countries with above-average values in at least five dimensions can be differentiated from another array with clearly below-average values.
To identify and present the dimensions of structural stability for each country, a heptagonshaped net diagram (hereafter called a "diamond") has been drawn up in which the average values of all seven dimensions studied, based on the main unit of 58 BMZ partner countries, are depicted (green line) together with, simultaneously, the specific values of the dimensions for the particular country (red line). In this way, variances in the values of single countries from the average can be illustrated graphically, thus helping to identify possible patterns of variance.
A basic prerequisite for the creation of such a graphic representation of the localization of each country with regard to the seven dimensions is the standardization of the variables used; that is, all variables must be brought to the same scale setting, where a common, standardized spread of the values with a mean value of 0 and a standard variance of 1 exists. 16 In this case, the direction of the values of the variables was first standardized. All variables were to display amelioration with increasing values; therefore, for the following variables the values had to be reversed: the Gini Index for income/consumption equality (%, average for the 1990s), political rights (Freedom House) 1991-2000, and civil liberty (Freedom House) 1991-2000.
One exception is the dependent variable human security, which is not represented in the diamonds. Its respective value is stated in a field next to the diamonds and displays a deterioration of human security with an increasing value:
• 1 = good performance, no human security problems during the previous ten-year period
• 2 = some human security problems, not at higher levels The graphical presentation of the countries' seven dimensions allows for the identification of patterns of variance (for example, an array of countries with clearly above-average values in at least five dimensions compared to an array of countries with clearly below-average values in at least five dimensions), thus enabling a clustering and the formation of categories based on the countries' human security value as well as the patterns of variance. Figures 1 and 2 show the diamonds of the dimensions for all cases which exhibit clear patterns in terms of above-or below-average values. 16 A standardization is carried out more precisely by subtracting the arithmetical mean from each value xi of a spread X and dividing each resulting difference by the standard variance sx of the spread X. One obtains a zstandardized spread Z, which has a mean value of 0 and a standard variance of 1. 17 Originally the lines were red and green, respectively. 
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Interpretation and Clustering of Cases
ment of the cases into different degrees of structural stability is obvio The assign us. One-third, structurally stable (low level of violence); only egory and would be classified as "structurally unstable" (see Table 2 ). This means that the first group of countries is able-all things considered-to solve or at least nonviolently handle conflicts occurring in a democratization process or otherwise and can be considered more likely to be shock resistant. The last group, on the other hand, is extremely prone to shocks and not able to handle its conflicts nonviolently. A conclusive typology needs to incorporate a second axis of characteristics with regard to the independent variables. A classification based on the number of positively rated dimensions of structural stability (above-average values) could make sense. Table 3 provides a first indication by considering it a good precondition if five dimensions of structural stability exhibit above-average values and, in turn, considering it a poor precondition if five of seven dimensions are below average. Another limitation has to be brou ard: I ple the concept of structural stability has been postulated as being valid only for trans ates. We operationalized it in such a way that states satisfied this criterion if they un ent a change of regime type (for example, introduction of a multiparty system) between 1990 and 2000 and/or if wars broke out or were ended. This means that the concept is not valid for ten of the 58 countries studied. Syria (no change) an Coast (change of regime t ould not be assigned to the scheme due to a lack of crit Ultimately, we could de clear outcomes for only 45 countries The classification carried out above provides, at a glance, the average values of the dimencourse of time and that in certain years a different classification would have followed cannot be ignored.
As shown in the previous section, we could not find strong correlations based on the available data, much less establish causalities. Table 3 suggests, however, a certain plausibility 18 Yet it is plausible that states that did not undergo changes of regime type or see a war begin or end during this period would also react similarly in the case of such events. However, they were not exposed to such shocks. Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Chad) with "very poor" or "poor" values for the dependent variable. In total, only twelve of 46 ca larified," that is, show strong and unambiguous relationships between the dimensio structural stability.
Varying strongly from this logic an refore requiring explana following groups:
• States within the gray area of not confirming but also not ing the hypothesis or with below-avera ension of structural that n vertheless ex- the last four have lived t its system during the period studied and yet is equally "paradoxically" situated). Only the Algerian Civil War (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) seems to clearly exhibit more than one local dimension. Still, this could be a plausible reason why these states have worse values in the dependent variable than anticipated.
Another approach to plausible statements follows from an examination of the values in the formulated categories (see Table 4 ).
This overview sho democracy and rule of law and high values of structural stability. Not only the especially stable countries-with a variance from the average value of over 1.0 in both dimensions (democracy and rule of law), such as Benin, Chile, and Mongolia-but also those gray-area states with a dimensions, someclear connection between democracy/rule of law and human security is apparent, which, on times twice as strong (Bolivia, Namibia). 19 Within the states with below-average values with high stability, Madagascar still exhibits only two positive values in these dimensions. Thus, a
Ghana, as an exception within the category of stable countries with above-average values in the dimensions, exhibits 19 only average values for "rule of law" and "democracy." Table 6 ). 21 Sri Lanka's only two negative values-in a country with overall above-average results in the dimensions but with high instability-are found in inclusion (strongly negative) and rule of law. In the case of Turkey the values are only marginally more positive; here, too, the only two negative dimensions are inclusion of identity groups and rule of law. In summarizing this section, one can state:
• The synopsis of the features shows that it is not possible to create a typology that allows for the formation of clearly distinct ("disjoint") types with a high practical relevance. The functionality of the indicator used (access to purified water) is also dependent on the overall water supply: the problems of a Sahel country are not directly comparable to those of a country neighboring the Amazon. This exemplifies the difficulty of precisely assessing the validity of this dimension, which is important at the policy level.
• On the other hand, the systematic analysis of the identified values allows for the identifi- 
Conclusion
This study has endeavored to onditions of structural stability and to test the mut conditi com dicators for the assessm dimensions of structural stability ha ated, ave been depicted, and on their basis, types of structural stability hav identified.
The identification of suitable indicators was not equally s even dimensions of structural stability. Data were often fragmentary or not available for longer periods of time.
t variable exists only for the period from 1990 to 2000, the investigation had to be partially limited to this research period. In various cases a correlation and, Since data for the dependen in turn, a causality problem exists: Between the studied correlations and the actual or assumed causalities an attribution gap generally arises. Linear statements, which would be necessary for an unambiguous determination of an instrument mix or the ideal sequence of measures, were not possible. These challenges limit the declarative power of the endeavor.
The initial expectation that the correlation of the various dimensions of structural stability with the dependent variable of human security would result in clear types of structural stability and structural instability was not confirmed. Accordingly, the results are only of a very tentative character. This is first of all an expression of the fact that the seven dimensions of structural stability are a political postulate-and not the result of a systematic theoretical an political lessons-learned process or stringent empirical analysis. The assumed interdependent relation between the seven dimensions of structural stability is plausible but cannot be stringently proven with the procedure used in this initial study. The same is true of the postulate mutual enhancement or weakening of the s the study but cannot be confirmed as a general rule either. This would only be possible with roved indicators and further calculations (for example, regression analysis).
security" on the one hand and the indicators for "democracy" and "rule of law," respectively, the other. Also, between the dimensions "inclusion of identity groups effectiveness" and "human security" a positive relation can be identified. The dimensions stainable economic growth"; "environmental security"; and-eliminating statistical out-lie s-"social equality" are inconclusive. For the intended formation of types, this meant that r attributions and mutually enhancing effects were hard to deduce; they may appear usible in individual cases, but in order to confirm them as causal, methodological analysis t cannot be achieved by quantitative statistical methods alone is required.
pite these reservations, a preliminary clustering of the countries seems possible: In the gory of states that experience only a low degree of violent conflict, a large group-15 of states-has above-average values for "democracy" and " ity-that is, the mutual relations between the variables-would be considered by a comprehensive instrumentation estimate at all times.
By means of these measures, the attribution gap between the observed correlations and the actual causalities would be reduced noticeably. Statements regarding a useful policy-mix for a given situation would be based on a resilient foundation. Through the introduction of an actor dimension, that is, a level of activity ("governance matters"), into the research, a dynamic dimension could be depicted that would allow for discussion of those cases in which a comparable initial situation leads to different paths and outcomes. This would also be im gard to those states that we have located in the gray area between above-average values in at least five dimensions and below-average values in at least five dimensions of structural stability.
Finally, we expect that the observed correlations can be understood and explained through the completion of a limited number of empirical case studies. In combination with the other amplifications of the research approach mentioned, concrete and resilient development pol-
